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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVII. PROCEDURE-JUBISDICTION-AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY IN OOERIOR
CotmT WHERE CAUSE OF ACTION IS SPLIT-Plaintiff, a manufacturer's
agent, sued bis employer in the Municipal Court, Civil Division, Washington,
D. C. in two separate actions to recover commissions on bis contract of employment. The two actions were consolidated for trial. At the trial defendant
moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the ground that this was but one
cause of action and, while neither of the claims individually exceeded the
jurisdictional maximum, the total claimed in both suits did exceed it. The
motion to dismiss was denied, and after trial, judgments were entered for plaintiff in both actions. Defendant appealed. The Municipal Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held, this was but a sing,e cause of action and
therefore the total amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional limit. The
motion to dismiss should be granted. Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, (Mun. Ct.
App. D.C. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 332.
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of an inferior court is determined by the
amount demanded, not the amount due. 1 In the principal case, each complaint stated a cause of action and demanded an amount within the jurisdictional limits of the court. On the face of the summons and complaint, therefore, it appeared in each action that the court had jurisdiction. Where the
plaintiff has split bis cause of action in order to bring it in an inferior court,
however, there is a tendency on the part of the courts to treat this as a jurisdictional question rather than a situation which calls for the ordinary rules
applicable to splitting a cause of action.2 It is submitted that the fact that the
defendant has a right to object to splitting the cause of action should not alter
the question as to whether in each of these claims the court had jurisdiction.
Had part of the claim been brought first, the courts generally would say that
the inferior court could render a valid judgment as to that claim because it was
within the jurisdictional limits of the court.3 In the event of a second suit on
1 Bridges v. Joanna Cotton Mills, 214 S.C. 319, 52 S.E. (2d) 406 (1949); 51 C.J.S.,
Justices of the Peace §35(a) (1947).
2 The principal reason for this attitude seems to be the feeling that the plaintiff is
committing a fraud on the general trial court in that by splitting his cause of action he
avoids that court's jurisdiction. State ex rel. Shawver v. Casto, (W.Va. 1952) 68 S.E.
(2d) 673; 51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace §35(a)(f) (1947).
3 Jt is generally held that an inferior court has jurisdiction to tiy an action where the
amount demanded is within its jurisdictional limit and to render a judgment up to that
limit regardless of the fact that there is or may be a larger amount of damages actually
owing. 51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace §35(a) (1947). This rule sometimes goes under
the somewhat misleading name of "remission." By that the courts mean that in bringing
his claim for the lesser amount in the inferior court, the plaintiff constructively remits the
excess of his claim if the defendant properly raises an objection to the splitting. This is
nothing more than the ordinary application of the rules of res judicata. By giving it a
special name, however, some courts seem to find it easier to shelve res judicata and regard
the question as jurisdictional. See State ex rel. Shawver v. Casto, supra note 2. If the
court has jurisdiction to render the judgment in the first action, it is difficult to see how
the subsequent actions of the plaintiff could operate retroactively to divest the court of
jurisdiction in the first instance and render the judgment void.
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the rest of the cause of action, the courts would apply the ordinary rules of res
judicata concerning splitting causes of action.4 They would not ordinarily
take the position that the total of the prior judgment and the sum claimed in the
present action exceeded the jurisdictional amount and that therefore the inferior
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, but on the contrary
would permit a second judgment in the municipal court on the same cause of
action so long as the defendant did not object.5 If two judgments in the same
court on the same cause of action which together exceed the jurisdictional limit
are void for want of jurisdiction, then the failure of the defendant to object
would be of no consequence since the court could raise the issue on its own
motion. 6 From that it would appear that there is a want of jurisdiction only
if the claims are brought simultaneously.7 Yet the mere fact that the total
amount adjudicated by the court in any one trial exceeds the jurisdictional limit
is not controlling because had there actually been two separate causes of action
against defendant which were either joined or consolidated for trial, there is
little question but that the municipal court would have had jurisdiction even
though the total amount in controversy in the two actions exceeded the jurisdictional limit.8
The policy against splitting a cause of action is designed chiefly to protect
the defendant from vexation by a multiplicity of suits,9 and normally the
defenses arising out of splitting, i. e., pendency of another action and res
judicata, either merger or bar, are solely in the hands of the defendant and may
be waived by him at will. By a failure to object, the defendant is not giving
jurisdiction to the inferior court where it had none before, but is merely waiving his right to be free from vexatious litigation, and whether the court tries
the claims one at a time or all together should have no bearing on the question
of jurisdiction. Only the defendant is harmed by the splitting, and he is well
equipped to defend himself. In any situation where the suits are not tried
together, he has an option: he can wait until judgment is rendered in one of
the suits and then plead it as res judicata in the other or he can have whichever claim he chooses abated, and then if plaintiff does not ask for a voluntary
nonsuit in the other, he can plead res judicata as in the first situation. 10 If,
4 ]UDGMENl'S RESTATEMENT §62, comment m (1942). Splitting a cause of action is
simply a problem in res judicata. CLARK, CoDE PLEADING §73 (1947).
5 Res judicata must be properly pleaded before it is a defense. It can be waived by the
consent of the defendant. ]UDGMENl'S RESTATEMENT §62, comment m (1942); 1 C.J.S.,
Actions §102(g) (1936); 1 AM. Jun., Actions §101 (1936).
s Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 12(h), 28 U.S.C. (1946).
7 See State ex rel. Shawver v. Casto, supra note 2.
s Louisville & N.R. Co. v. United States, (D.C. Ky. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 999.
9 1 C.J.S., Actions §102(c) (1936).
10 If defendant has one of the actions abated, it will serve as a warning to plaintiff
that he can expect the defense of res judicata to be raised in the other action, and he may
then feel that the wiser move would be to have his action dismissed and bring both actions
in the court of general jurisdiction. By doing nothing until a judgment is handed down in
one of the actions, defendant stands a good chance of defeating the other one by pleading
res judicata. A few cases collected in 62 A.L.R. 256 (1929) indicate that if defendant
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as here, the suits are tried together so that there is a practical danger of simultaneous judgments, defendant has only one choice and that is to have one of
the actions abated until there is a judgment in the other.11 In the principal
case, the court had jurisdiction over each of the actions and even if the question were properly raised would have no right to dismiss both of them. It
could, however, dismiss either of them if the defendant had pleaded a defense
in abatement in one of his answers. Here, however, the defense in abatement was waived12 because defendant failed to plead it in his answer. It is
submitted that since defendant received a trial on the merits on both claims,
albeit in an inferior court, the court should have denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and should have permitted both judgments to stand rather than take
the position that the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the claims.
John F. Spindler, S. Ed.

fails to raise the defense of pendency of another action before judgment is rendered in one

of the actions he will be deemed to have consented to the splitting and will not be permitted to plead res judicata in the second action. It is doubtful whether these cases represent the majority rule, and on principle they should not if the courts are interested in
forceful application of the rule against splitting, The defense of res judicata should not be
held to have been waived since it was not in existence until a judgment was rendered in
one of the actions.
11 Pendency of another action is pleaded under the Federal Rules in the same manner
as any other affirmative defense. It must be set forth in the answer as provided by Rule
8(c), 28 U.S.C. (1946). It may not be raised on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b),
28 U.S.C. (1946), for that rule permits defenses involving matters outside of the record
to be raised on motion to dismiss only in certain enumerated instances and the defense of
pendency of another action is not one of them. Sproul v. Gambone, (D.C. Pa. 1940) 34
F. Supp. 441; Dirk Ter Haar v. Seaboard Oil Co. of Del., (D.C. Cal. 1940) 1 F.R.D. 598.
See also the headnote in 102 Bui. 14, U.S. Dept. of Justice Decisions on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1941).
12 The defense of pendency of another action is a defense in abatement. It is purely
for the convenience of the defendant. A failure to raise it by proper and timely objection
constitutes a waiver. Brooks v. Woods, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 716. This is also the
tenor of the decisions prior to the Federal Rules. In re Eiler's Music House, (9th Cir.
1921) 274 F. 330 at 335; In re Buchan's Soap Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1909) 169 F. 1017.
Res judicata, on the other hand, is a defense on the merits. It may be waived by a failure
to plead it before judgment, but it can be raised by a motion to amend the answer on the
grounds of a subsequently arising defense on the merits at any time before final judgment.
See note 10 supra.

